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Introduction
Although they were not known as such, early statebuilding operations after 1989 were often ad hoc elaborations of more familiar Cold War UN Chapter Six peacekeeping operations, like West Irian and the Congo. The progressive nature of this elaboration reflected changes in UN permanent-five veto politics, and the concomitant rise in demand for conflict settlement and development. Various terms were proposed for these changes, from peacekeeping, through multi-dimensional and second generation operations (Lewis 1993; Mackinlay and Chopra 1993) . The level of emphasis, however, was clear: operations were focused on achieving results in consensual host environments, and superpower, interests were more locally ascertained. 1 Since then, the pendulum has again swung. Statebuilding 2.0, as I refer to it here, is a version of local intervention shaped and driven by external conditions. Where once superpower antagonisms framed international conflict resolution, more recently global governance has shaped emergent peace settlements and post-settlement development.
This version of statebuilding, vastly up-scaled, more expensive, more intrusive and more complex, has come to represent the practice in which domestic democratization is externally-assisted to ensure conformity to international governance norms such as Liberal democracy and neoliberal economic practices whilst implanting rules and conditions for 'best practice' in national government. It creates terms to regulate internal state behaviour to secure peace such that a state's credentials conform to international criteria for local democratic practices, whilst creating sovereign compliance with wider global governance demands. Statebuilding 2.0 and its role in wider peacebuilding facilitates states' connection to global governance regimes by harmonizing the rules of state behaviour with peace-and wealth-developing external bodies like the UN and World Bank and the global governance regimes for which they stand. Ottaway refers to such states as existing 'by a fiat of the international community which recognizes them as sovereign entities whether or not they have a government capable of effectively controlling or administering [a] territory ' (2002: 1003) .
However, whilst this captures the urgency of the global 'democratization' debate, the emphasis on the local legitimacy of indigenous political institutions to the captive audience is much less studied, Despite the fairly limited (by comparison) consideration of this end of political legitimacy, the creation of a stable polity depends first and foremost 1 Cambodia is slightly different. Ending the superpower patronage of the regional clients indicates that much was involved outside of Cambodia. This is because the Cold War was both played out and terminated before and after 1989, as a consequence of achieving a grass roots settlement that suited external actors more than it did several regional actors, including Viet Nam and Laos. International influence was sustained throughout the operation because both the US and China were tied to the Khmer Rouge, whose involvement had been a condition of US and Chinese consent to the operation. Operations after Cambodia were more distinctly rooted in the post-1989 era.
on stability 'taking off' within the state being built or rebuilt, and this depends to a large extent on whether the elite is considered legitimate by its citizens. Without this relationship, there is less likely to be external validation of and cooperation with national polities, and even less of state conformity with international global governance regimes. I propose a revised approach to statebuilding to develop local legitimacy and its international corollary, which I refer to here as statebuilding 3.0.
This article reviews the split in the statebuilding literature between that emphasizing the enhancement of global governance norms and regimes; and that which addresses the impact of democracy in the statebuilding spaces to which it migrates. These spaces include post-conflict states, most normally those emerging from conflict shrouded by Cold War priorities. But they also include post-colonial states where there has been no conventional conflict, where the State is deemed to have failed and where intervention is consensual. The paper then discusses debates on achieving state-level democracy, between transitologists and structuralists, before surveying a further sub-element of the debate regarding 'democratic legitimacy' and 'performance legitimacy' at grass roots.
The former refers to that type of democratization that finds acceptance with external observers, for example, in the evident holding of elections. The latter concerns whether the newly-acquired legitimacy conferred on the state from without is matched internally by societal consent to their State's authority. Given deep and lengthy traditions of mistrust of the state per se in most statebuilding environs, it is suggested here that much more work is required to ensure any temporary local political stability is maintained in the immediate to short-term and beyond. This issue is at once essential as a foundational element of peace, statebuilding and peacebuilding, but is often low on the intervention's agenda. I will then advance a potential solution which may create and/or underscore local legitimacy; enhance basic human rights; improve human security; and underscore global governance regimes.
Statebuilding
Statebuilding can be considered an evolution of early post-Cold War peacekeeping initiatives. Mandates were initially relatively limited in most cases. Key priorities involved, for example, electioneering in Namibia, and elections and demobilization in Angola, El Salvador and Mozambique. In Cambodia, an early manifestation of contemporary statebuilding became clearer. The UN operation there involved polling, disarmament, demobilization, demining and limited political trusteeship with suspended sovereignty. More recently, statebuilding operations' ambits have expanded to consider the ramifications not only of armed combatants and elite dysfunctionalism, but also of 'disintegrated capacity to respond to citizens' needs and desires, and [failure to] provide basic public services [and] assure citizens' welfare'. In addition, statebuilding addresses the absence, 'at the international level, of a credible entity that represents the state beyond its borders ' (Brinkerhoff 2005: 3; Chandler 2007) . Thus, statebuilding interventions may be considered in part as vehicles with a multilevel ambit, involving the creation and sustenance of global liberal norms through stabilizing local peace and development processes using liberal instruments and policies.
In order to achieve this, early post-Cold War engagements evinced an approach that came to be known as 'transitology'. Transitology relies on an assumption that, regardless of history, democracy is an essentially portable political system (Grugel 2002; Ignatieff 2003; Rustow 1970) . Hopeful as this commitment to democracy export was, the 'transition paradigm' received short shrift as a result of a series of unreliable and inconsistent transformations in practice. It was further undermined by the belief that democratization can in some way reach an end point after a transitional process. It might instead be viewed as a journey, rather than a destination (Kingsbury 2007: 121; Carothers 2002 2 This is but a reflection of all democratization as a social construction subject to permanent flux.
Transitology has not stood well the test of time or practice. Diamond et al (1999: ix) describe the outcomes of early transitions as 'pseudo-democracies', whilst Zakaria refers to them 'illiberal democracies ' (1997: 27 Chandler's work is set in a wider debate regarding epistemology and ontology; but in terms of statebuilding, its importance here is that it highlights the relegation of internal legitimacy-promoting processes at the expense of processes aimed at forming a state capable of fitting into and reflecting international norms.
Brinkerhoff concurs. In his view, a state's ability to 'respond to citizens needs and demands seems to take a lower priority' compared with its ability to conform to international norms ( legitimacy is unlikely to develop, such that they may be addressed.
Domestic legitimacy from past to present
It would be unwise to suggest that every statebuilding environment is the same. However, in many instances, the theme of civil mistrust and elite manipulation of state institutions is common. Kamrava argues that 'in essence, the politics of the Third World is driven by continuous struggles on the part of governments to attain legitimacy and in the process to institutionalize themselves in their respective societies ' (1993: 2) . But institutionalization cannot be considered without reference to the goals involved and how this confers or denies social acceptance and local legitimacy. This is an essential starting point in rethinking how we view state institutions from within: what do they mean, and for whom? The following are necessarily generalizations at a thematic level, and they reflect Englebert's argument that locates state illegitimacy 'at the core of the developmental failure of many African states ' (2002: 173) . Furthermore, it reflects Bastian and Luckham's argument that to understand such social relations requires 'a historical perspective… both to offset democracy Triumphalism and to counter pessimism over conflict and state failure ' (2003: 306) .
Pre-imperial
Before 
Imperial
Although some have maintained that the imperial era involved an export of ideas, the notion of self-determination was not one of them. For many, but not all, newly-colonized and -bounded societies, the appearance of the metropolitan, far-reaching state in their midst, and the rules of conduct that accompanied it, were not vastly different from earlier experiences (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1982; Meredith 2005; Tambiah 1977) . The relationship between civil society and imperial and locally co-opted elites was often violently extractive, and most of the key state institutions that civil society engaged with were of an authoritarian nature in the image of imperial domination. Colonial-imperial authority was resented, and not to be challenged without the threat of punishment through transparently abusive institutions. Quite brutal rule was normal, and often the State took the form of a hostile political body, to be feared by the population it sought to control.
Again, such state institutions rarely provided for basic needs, and in some circumstances, essential needs were denied or stolen by elites and contributed to local perceptions of state illegitimacy (Jackson 2005; Rodney 1973; Tambiah 1977) . Levi- Strauss 1969; Schmidt et al 1977; Wolf 1966) . Such relationships are so common that they are often arise in common vernacular, and as slang, demonstrating their pervasiveness. In Nigeria, the elite may be referred to as 'Wa-benzi', or the 'Mercedes Benz people/tribe', and in Cambodia, mass common social patronage is referred to by the term 'khsae', or 'string', denoting the wide and deep connective network of essential sustenance.
A legitimacy deficit?
A central theme, then, linking pre-colonial, imperial and independence eras may be broadly characterized as a combination of increasing contact with, and exploitation of, The relationship between social provision and local stability via institutional legitimacy persists is also considered by Clapham. He argues that 'mayhem can be reduced, if not in every case prevented, by well-crafted intervention designed not only to strengthen states, but to meet the human needs that must ultimately justify their existence ' (2003: 92) .
Similarly, Call and Cousens maintain that state legitimacy can be generated through a variety of approaches, included the more conventional method of securing border. But in addition, they also argue that 'the capacity to deliver core services to a vulnerable population' is another mechanism by which legitimacy may be secured (2008: 9).
We may make a number of reasonable claims at this point. ' (2002: 770) .
Developing state legitimacy through public goods provision
In most statebuilding environments, three things persist: extreme peripheral poverty; mistrust of the state (especially where the state is perceived as the cause of such impoverishment); and weak state institutions. The essential question here is how to develop state legitimacy through essential welfare provision that is almost certainly beyond the capacity of the State to provide, since it will almost always be impoverished and incapable of raising sufficient tax revenue. I will elaborate below an approach to enhancing state legitimacy through international public lending targeted through local State institutions for essential welfare provision in the field of sanitation and hygiene.
The UN has declared that 'diseases transmitted through water or human waste are the second leading cause of death among children worldwide… [amounting to] an estimated 3,900… every day' (UNDP 2005: 24) . It is estimated by reliable sources that more than a billion people have no access to clean water at all, and nearly two-and-a-half billion lacked in basic sanitation (WHO 2005) . The burden of disease aggravated by these conditions is crippling in future developmental terms, but also causes mass avoidable lethalities and expensive-to-treat sicknesses, like cholera, typhoid, sleeping sickness, malaria, yellow fever and guinea worm, to name but a few cited by the WHO (2005).
Furthermore, the sicker children are, the less time they can spend in school, further undermining development and doing nothing at all for cementing positive relationships between State and society. Since this priority is recognized for its essential and foundational role in successful European development and prosperity in the early part of the 20 th Century, there should be no reason not to elevate and fund it, assuming development and prosperity are the objectives (WHO 2007: 2-4) . This approach, if broadly applied, would likely prevent innumerable avoidable deaths in the most vulnerable 'under-fives' category, create social trust in the State, underscore long-term development and reduce excessive birth rates and associated pressure on local resources.
The process itself could be validated through independent accountability institutions, with further financial incentives for States achieving agreed targets (see below). Both international and local roles could be further validated against extant international legislation, with the effect of expanding domestic State legitimacy into the realm of international governance regimes (Ku and Diehl, 2006) .
The concept of lending conditionality has been with us for some time. It has been applied with varying levels of success to countries in the developing world to economicallyincentivize democratic practices. It acts as a lever on internal political evolution, and is criticized by some as being neo-imperial in intention. It could, however, be applied much less contentiously to less ideologically-inflammatory subjects such as healthcare. Since it is clear in development and medical circles that basic and easily manageable illnesses like diarrhea account for enormous strains on society, seriously impact upon developmental potential in very poor states, and kill millions of people avoidably, international financial institutions (IFIs) might reasonably invest in supporting the foundations of sound health policies that will impact positively on long-term economic development and which will enhance the virtue of the State in the eyes of its population.
Furthermore, since this subsidized, State-delivered healthcare approach is credited with having elevated Europe from grim industrial poverty to world-class regional superpower, and since unlike democracy, health is indeed a universally transferable concept, there are few sound reasons not to support such a programme. And privatizing healthcare is clearly not an option, since people with no money cannot buy monetized goods, and State legitimacy would not be a factor in such a model (Helleiner, 2001: 246-247) . One critique of such an approach might be that it is small-scale. However, the effects of such delivery are much more rapid and visible than the development of political institutions and economic wealth through market liberalism; and they are easier to facilitate and spread, and are more universally acceptable. Cichon and Hagemejer point out that forms of social security provision can rapidly be established and be effective, and are 'direct and fast in a way that the putative benefits of "trickle down" effects of economic growth cannot match (2007: 175) . Maria Ottawa refers to the glacial pace of present institution building and comments that 'it is only when the basic problem has been solved that it makes sense to talk about building institutions that will regulate the exercise of power ' (2002: 1016) . The 'basic problem' within a state in the immediate aftermath of elections is to create, where absent, state institutional legitimacy in order to reduce the reasons a society might have for attacking the state.
This approach can be seen as a development of Dreze and Sen's refined model of social security in the developing world. Whereas social security in the developed world has been conceptualized at relatively mild terms of 'protection from adversity and deficiency', conditions in developing countries tend to be further removed from the utility of these remits, prompting Dreze and Sen to conceptualize social protection triggers in terms of 'protection and promotion'. In this view, protection refers to stopping any decline in extant living standards. Promotion refers to 'the enhancement of general living standards… ' (1989: 16) . In most statebuilding spaces, the 'general living standard'
is often in fact a routine struggle for daily survival, maintained through a variety of models of common social patronage, local networks, kinship relations, patron-client relations and so on (Scott 1985; Schmidt et al 1977; Roberts 2001) . Instigating social conditionality as outlined above could serve both elements of Dreze and Sen's model.
Local, small scale distribution practices, illustrated well by IFFIm-type practices, would protect people -especially children -from basic and preventable illnesses, whilst largerscale investment in public sanitation would furnish States with the ability to elevate life experiences beyond the most basic. Both would contribute to State legitimacy and internal stability, upon both of which the entire developmental process rests (along with the presence of traditional security measures).
The local level process could be made reasonably accountable. It could devolve the process of external medical support to local delivery means via national and international NGOs, avoiding cash transactions that may disappear within the workings of the State, whilst delivery could be monitored by a combination of local and independent observers.
There will likely always be some degree of manipulation of resources, for reasons of greed or for reasons of essential sustenance (Wang and Rosenau, 2001; Roberts 2008a (Jolly, 1995; Ingebritsen 2002) . Indeed, these approaches form the very underpinning of much constructivist debate in explaining how the world changes so routinely, based on changes in the predominance of particular ideas at particular times (Cox, 1981; Elgstrom, 2000; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) .
Conclusion
One of the weakest and most important links in statebuilding is the creation of a stable domestic environment in countries emerging from wars. Emphasis -choice -is normally placed on traditional security mechanisms that reflect Realist preoccupation with the military and other disciplinarian arms of the State. This needs to stay. But it should not distract our attention from the importance of stabilizing State-society relations, and a readily disbursable means of achieving trust between the two often contrarian elements of a country is to connect them with one another through essential health provision. This perspective is quite clearly a subjective one, but so too is the present model of between needs in the South, power in the North, and stability for both.
